A closer look at the measurement of dispositional reasoning : dimensionality and invariance across assessor groups by De Kock, François S. et al.
OR I G I N A L A R T I C L E
A closer look at the measurement of dispositional reasoning:
Dimensionality and invariance across assessor groups
François S. De Kock1 | Filip Lievens2 | Marise Ph. Born1
1Institute of Psychology, Erasmus University
Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
2Department of Personnel Management and
Work and Organizational Psychology, Ghent
University, Gent, Belgium
Correspondence
François De Kock, School of Management
Studies, University of Cape Town, Private
Bag X3, Rondebosch, Cape Town 7701,
South Africa.
Email: francois.dekock@uct.ac.za
Despite the growing interest in dispositional reasoning as a construct and determinant of good
raters (‘good judges’), its measurement still requires attention. We address two measurement
issues in the present study. First, this study tests a hierarchical model as a more parsimonious
account for dispositional reasoning than component- or general-factor models that were examined
in earlier studies. So, this provides a more comprehensive test of the different measurement mod-
els underlying dispositional reasoning data. Second, we assess the measurement invariance of
dispositional reasoning measure scores across two different populations of assessors that are
often trained and used in workplace assessments, namely psychology students (N5161) and man-
agers (N5160). Results showed that dispositional reasoning is well represented as componential
in nature, with a higher-order construct underlying three lower-order components. A comparison
of managers and psychology students through measurement invariance analysis showed relatively
similar factor structures underlying dispositional reasoning scores across these groups, but metric
invariance could be only partially established.
1 | INTRODUCTION
The characteristics of the good raters (‘good judges’) have intrigued
researchers and practitioners for a long time (e.g., see Funder, 2012;
Taft, 1955; Vernon, 1933). Recent efforts to explain individual differen-
ces in judgment accuracy have shown promise for dispositional reason-
ing as a key determinant of what makes a good judge. Dispositional
reasoning can be defined as a rater’s complex knowledge of traits,
behaviors, and situations’ potential to elicit traits into manifest behav-
iors (Christiansen, Wolcott-Burnam, Janovics, Burns, & Quirk, 2005).
Research (Christiansen et al., 2005; De Kock, Lievens, & Born, 2015)
revealed that interviewers’ dispositional reasoning was the strongest
predictor of accuracy among a set of individual differences that
included demographics, personality, and general cognitive ability.
Moreover, it showed discriminant validity with personality traits and
convergence with measures of cognitive ability (rs 5.43 and .68, in the
two studies cited, respectively).
Conceptually, dispositional reasoning has three distinguishable
components: trait induction is the ability to know how traits manifest
themselves in behavior; trait extrapolation is an understanding of how
traits and their behavioral manifestations naturally co-vary; and trait
contextualization refers to the ability to identify situations that are rele-
vant for expressing traits (De Kock et al., 2015). Importantly, each of
these components is not measured through a self-report questionnaire.
Instead, Christiansen et al. measured these components via a multiple
choice test in which people, for instance, have to assign adjectives to
constructs (Big Five) or determine which situation is the best for
observing specific trait-related behavior related to constructs such as
complexity or sociability (see also examples in Tett & Guterman, 2000).
Despite the growing interest in dispositional reasoning as a con-
struct and determinant of a good judge, its measurement still requires
further attention. The measurement drawbacks of earlier studies are
twofold. First, although Christiansen et al. (2005) conceptualized dispo-
sitional reasoning as consisting of three components, their measure
‘did not permit reliable subscale scores to be computed for the
hypothesized domains’ (p. 143). To address this issue, De Kock et al.
(2015) revised the original measure to yield reliable subscale scores
and found that a three-factor solution fitted the data reasonably well.
However, measures of ability in the same conceptual domain often
show both ‘positive manifold’ (Horn & Cattell, 1966) and an hierarchical
nature (see Carroll, 2003, for a review), where broad factors at a higher
stratum affect narrow factors at lower strata. As dispositional reasoning
exhibits characteristics of an ability measure (De Kock et al., 2015) it
may also potentially have an hierarchical configuration—including a
general factor influencing the three specific components. Therefore,
this study tests a hierarchical model as a more parsimonious account
for the underlying structure of dispositional reasoning scores than com-
ponent- or general-factor models that were examined in earlier studies.
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This provides a more comprehensive test of the different measurement
models underlying dispositional reasoning data.
A second measurement issue is that prior dispositional reasoning
studies used two different populations of judges, namely either psychol-
ogy students1 (Christiansen et al., 2005; Powell & Bourdage, 2016;
Powell & Goffin, 2009) or managers (De Kock et al., 2015). From a prac-
tice perspective, a focus on either of these two populations makes
indeed a lot of sense because both groups constitute the typical pools of
assessors that are trained and used in workplace assessments (Krause &
Thornton, 2009; Lievens, 2001a). Evidence also suggests that combining
psychologists and managers produces the greatest predictive validity
(Gaugler, Rosenthal, Thornton, & Bentson, 1987). However, only when
the measurement structure is invariant between these two populations,
dispositional reasoning scores can be compared and merged across these
groups of assessors. Therefore, it is important to know whether the dis-
positional reasoning measure works equally well for both populations.
These two unclear measurement features of dispositional reason-
ing impede progress not only on the aforementioned conceptual issues,
but it has also practical implications for the use of the dispositional
measure. For example, assessor training interventions may be tailored
to target specific components (induction, extrapolation, or contextuali-
zation) if these components are distinguishable. Moreover, lack of mea-
surement invariance (MI) of dispositional reasoning scores across rater
populations might require developing different measures for the
respective groups (i.e., managers vs. psychologists).
In short, this study aims to contribute to the small albeit growing
literature on dispositional reasoning as a key construct by investigating
its dimensionality through a more comprehensive set of confirmatory
factor analysis models (hierarchical, component-models, and general-
factor models). In addition, we examine the invariance of this measure
across two samples (psychology students and managers) that are often
trained in workplace assessments.
2 | STUDY BACKGROUND
2.1 | Dispositional reasoning: conceptualization
and research
Dispositional reasoning is defined as complex knowledge of traits,
behaviors and the potential of situations to elicit traits into manifest
behaviors (for a recent discussion, see De Kock et al., 2015). Disposi-
tional reasoning may allow good judges to process behavioral informa-
tion toward accurate trait inferences. Research (Christiansen et al.,
2005; De Kock et al., 2015) showed that interviewers’ dispositional
reasoning was the strongest predictor of accuracy among a set of indi-
vidual differences that included demographics, personality, and general
cognitive ability. In both these studies, participants watched videotaped
segments of individuals responding to employment interview questions
and judged the characteristics of the video interviewees. Accuracy was
measured by comparing raters’ judgments with those of ‘true scores,’
which were derived from targets’ self-reported personality dimensions
(Christiansen et al., 2005), or subject matter expert ratings of interview-
ees’ performance (De Kock et al., 2015). Moreover, dispositional
reasoning scores showed discriminant validity with personality traits
and convergence with measures of cognitive ability (rs 5.43 and .68, in
the two studies cited, respectively). Finally, in one of these studies (De
Kock et al., 2015) dispositional reasoning showed incremental validity
(DR25 .09, p5 .004; small to medium effect size, Cohen’s f25 .11)
over general mental ability to predict a key accuracy criterion (Bor-
man’s Differential Accuracy scores). As such, these findings speak for
the practical use of dispositional reasoning measures to screen and
select assessors in organizations. Other research investigated whether
it is possible to develop assessors’ dispositional reasoning through
training. Early attempts (Powell & Bourdage, 2016; Powell & Goffin,
2009) to enhance one of the components of dispositional reasoning—
so-called behavior-trait knowledge, also known as ‘induction’ (De Kock
et al., 2015)—with training, have been unsuccessful, however.
2.2 | Competing models of dispositional reasoning
Christiansen et al. (2005) conceptualized dispositional reasoning as
consisting of three components. However, their subscales of the differ-
ent components were too short to provide reliable subscale scores. So,
they assumed a general-factor model. De Kock et al. (2015) extended
the original measure to yield reliable subscale scores and found that a
three-factor solution (component-model) fitted the data reasonably
well. Apart from testing these models, this study tests for the first time
also an hierarchical model as a more parsimonious account for disposi-
tional reasoning than the component- or general-factor models that
were examined in earlier studies.
2.2.1 | Model 1: General-factor model
In a general-factor model underlying dispositional reasoning scores (see
Figure 1), assessors’ procedural and declarative knowledge structures
that relate to multiple domains—in this case, the areas of knowledge of
behaviors, traits, and situations—are encapsulated in a single broad fac-
tor. For example, items that measure one component (e.g., trait induc-
tion) overlap with items that tap into another (e.g., trait extrapolation),
resulting in a broad dispositional reasoning latent variable that causes
variance in all items, irrespective of the component that a specific item
was designed to measure. Therefore, the model assumes no distinction
between separate dispositional reasoning components.
In the broader literature, a well-known example of a general-factor
model is Spearman’s (1904) ‘g-theory’, that is, the view that perform-
ance at one type of cognitive task tends to be comparable to perform-
ance at other cognitive tasks. General-factor models also exist in other
literatures such as general affectivity (Cropanzano, Weiss, Hale, & Reb,
2003).
2.2.2 | Model 2: Three components (First order)
In a component-model of dispositional reasoning, specific abilities
related to understanding traits, behaviors, and situations cluster into
three facets. So, in such a model, dispositional reasoning has three dis-
tinguishable components: trait induction is the ability to know
how traits manifest themselves in behavior; trait extrapolation is an
understanding of how traits and their behavioral manifestations
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naturally co-vary; and trait contextualization refers to the ability to iden-
tify situations that are relevant for expressing traits. In a component-
model (see Figure 2), items load onto these three separate dimensions,
with no cross-loadings allowed.
Componential views of constructs are also encountered in the psy-
chology literature. Examples of componential models can be found for
emotional intelligence (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999) and for other
‘specific’ intelligences (Gardner, 1993).
2.2.3 | Model 3: Hierarchical model (Second order)
Dispositional reasoning can also be considered a hierarchically ordered
construct, with a general factor influencing the three specific compo-
nents (see Figure 3). An hierarchical structure for dispositional reason-
ing suggests a broad dispositional reasoning latent construct (i.e.,
higher-order factor) causing variance in the three specific components
(i.e., lower-order factors).
In the broader literature, measures of ability in the same concep-
tual domain often show an hierarchical nature (see Carroll, 2003, for a
review). For instance, in the intelligence literature, the early general (g)
versus specific (sn) intelligence debate has given way to a consensus
view of the hierarchical nature of abilities where broad factors at a
higher stratum affect narrow factors at lower strata.
2.3 | Rater groups and MI
As noted above, prior dispositional reasoning studies used two differ-
ent populations of assessors, namely either psychology students (Chris-
tiansen et al., 2005; Powell & Bourdage, 2016; Powell & Goffin, 2009)
FIGURE 1 A confirmatory factor analysis of the structure of dispositional reasoning: A general-factor model (Model M1). Only nine indica-
tor variables are used in this example, as demonstration
FIGURE 2 A confirmatory factor analysis of the structure of dispositional reasoning: A three-component (first-order) model (M2). Only
nine indicator variables are used in this example, as demonstration
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or managers (De Kock et al., 2015). Both of these groups constitute
the pools of assessors that are often trained and used in workplace
assessments (Krause & Thornton, 2009; Lievens, 2001a). In support of
this point, a survey of AC selection and development programs of 144
organizations in 18 countries (Thornton & Krause, 2009) reported that
70% used line managers, whereas external (44%) or internal (22%) psy-
chologists were also a popular choice.
Previous studies also found some rating differences between these
two populations. For example, Barr and Hitt (1986) examined the
selection decisions of professional interviewers and students and found
significant differences in the number and nature of factors used. In sev-
eral studies, Lievens (2001a,b) found that psychology students were
better able to provide distinct assessment center ratings than manag-
ers. Lievens attributed these findings on psychology students’ educa-
tion that had versed them more into the notion of psychological
constructs and their behavioral indicators.
Although these prior studies hint that a dispositional reasoning
measure might work differently for psychology students and manag-
ers, no earlier studies have considered the MI of dispositional reason-
ing across both of these groups. MI (Millsap, 2011) determines
whether ‘an assessment instrument is measuring the same constructs
in exactly the same way across groups’ (Byrne & Stewart, 2006, p.
287). Without invariance between managers and psychology stu-
dents, between-group comparisons of test scores may be misleading:
that is, we would not be sure if observed group differences are ‘real’
or confounded with differences in the structure of the constructs
and/or functioning of the measurement scales (Cheung, 2008). Only
when the measurement structure is invariant between these two
populations, dispositional reasoning scores can be compared across
these assessor groups.
3 | METHOD
3.1 | Participants
3.1.1 | Combined sample
For our study, it was important to limit the sample to participants that
form part of a broader population of potential assessors. Therefore, a
combined sample (N5321) of managers (49.8%) and psychology stu-
dents (50.2%) was selected because these are the people who are
most likely to be trained as assessors (Krause & Thornton, 2009). The
combined sample (54.4% females and 45.6% males) comprised 46.3%
Black African, 35.8% White, 11.1% Mixed Race, and 5.9% Asian/Indian
participants. Their mean age was 32.72 (SD511.13) years. English was
the official workplace language of all participants, although the preva-
lent first languages among these respondents were English (40.8%) and
Afrikaans (19%).
3.1.2 | Group 1: Psychology students
We recruited 161 students in Industrial-Organizational Psychology
from two universities in South Africa. Students were at various levels
of academic seniority, although most (59.5%) were postgraduates (i.e.,
they had finished their Bachelor’s degrees and were doing Honors- or
Masters-degrees at the time of the study). The rest were Bachelor’s
students.
3.1.3 | Group 2: Managers
Our second group consisted of 160 managerial personnel2 working in
various line and staff functions (e.g., HRM, finance, etc.) within two
organizations: a national police training academy and a supervisor train-
ing college. All of these respondents were undergoing staff develop-
ment training when they were assessed.
FIGURE 3 A confirmatory factor analysis of the structure of dispositional reasoning: Hierarchical (second-order) model (Model M3). Only
nine indicator variables are used in this example, as demonstration
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A comparison of the two samples showed that managers were
generally older (M542.3 years, SD56.7 years) than psychology stu-
dents (M522.8 years, SD53.5 years), t(221.02)531.142, p< .001.
The samples differed in terms of ethnic composition, as managers were
predominantly African (71.4%), as compared to students whom were
mostly White (55.6%).
3.2 | Procedure
The data collection was completed in multiple sessions within the
respective organizations. After introducing the research as part of
assessor training to develop self-insight about their dispositional rea-
soning, we explained participants’ rights and requested their informed
consent. Next, participants independently completed the research
questionnaire, before they were debriefed and thanked for their partic-
ipation. Following their study participation, assessors each received an
individual feedback report summarizing their performance on the
measure.
3.3 | Measures
3.3.1 | Dispositional reasoning
To measure the dispositional reasoning components, we used the
Revised Interpersonal Judgment Inventory (R-IJI)(De Kock et al., 2015)
—a revision of the original IJI (Christiansen et al., 2005). The Revised IJI
consisted of 64 items that measure three components. Example items
for each subscale may be found in Appendix A.
Induction
The induction component of dispositional reasoning was measured by
20 items that tapped candidates’ ability to make correct behavior-trait
inferences. After describing the Big Five personality traits, a list of
adjectives from Goldberg’s (1992) factor markers were presented. The
task was to identify the traits (e.g., conscientiousness) that best
matched the marker adjectives (e.g., thorough).
Extrapolation
The extrapolation component of dispositional reasoning was measured
by 23 items assessing a respondent’s understanding of how traits and
behaviors co-occur. Items described a fictional person in terms of traits
and behaviors and required respondents to select which of four
descriptions was most (or least) likely also true of the person.
Contextualization
The contextualization component of dispositional reasoning was
measured by 21 items that test understanding of trait–situation rele-
vance. On the basis of empirical results from an earlier study (Tett &
Guterman, 2000) one response option for each item was keyed as
being the most consistent with empirical evidence, theoretical rela-
tionships, and expert judgment. One subset of items presented a
trait description, for instance ‘empathy,’ by listing examples of
behaviors associated with high and low scorers on the trait. Next,
respondents had to choose which of five situations would most
likely elicit the relevant behavior.
3.3.2 | Biographical characteristics
To enable normative comparisons, we also requested respondents’ bio-
graphical details.
3.4 | Statistical analysis
To evaluate the latent structure of the revised dispositional reasoning
measure, we conducted both lower-order and higher-order confirma-
tory factor analysis (HCFA). First-order CFA was used to assess the
measurement model fit of both the global factor (M1) and three-
component (M2) models. Consequently, HCFA was used to evaluate
the higher-order model (M3). Hierarchical factor analysis is often used
when it is posited that specialized facets of intelligence (e.g., verbal rea-
soning, memory) are influenced by a broader dimension of intelligence
(g). In higher-order factor analysis, the factor correlations at a lower
level (i.e., between specialized facets of a broader construct) become
the input matrix for the higher-order factor analysis. The HCFA
attempts to provide a more parsimonious account for the inter-
correlations among lower-order factors (Brown, 2015).
Robust maximum likelihood estimation was employed to estimate
all models, unless stated otherwise. We used a number of fit indices to
evaluate model fit, including SBv2(Satorra & Bentler, 1988), CFI,
RMSEA (and its 90% confidence intervals), and SRMR. As recom-
mended by Byrne and Stewart (2006), the following minimum cutoffs
were applied to infer acceptable model fit: SBv2 (Satorra & Bentler,
1988) with p >.05; CFI> .95; RMSEA< .08; and SRMR< .08. Our
analyses were conducted with Lisrel 9.2 (J€oreskog & S€orbom, 2015).
3.4.1 | Data preparation for HCFA
Before we conducted the HCFA, we addressed a number of statistical
issues.
Item-to-sample size ratio
Our complete measure had 64 individual items. We decided not to
conduct HCFA of the full measurement model on item-level data in
this study because the number of parameters to be estimated in a
model with 64 observed variables—one for each item—would have
led to inadequate statistical power (MacCallum, Browne, & Suga-
wara, 1996; Wolf, Harrington, Clark, & Miller, 2013). Therefore, we
reduced the number of items in the scales to allow for sufficient
power and ensure appropriate model identification—issues that
were important for the subsequent hierarchical model analyses.
Upon inspection of the issues associated with reducing the number
of items in the scales (see Yang, Nay, & Hoyle, 2010) we decided to
create four indicator variables for each first-order latent variable by
using parcels of items within each scale as manifest variables, using
the procedures outlined by Little, Cunningham, Shahar, and Wida-
man (2002). Our parceling strategy is explained in Appendix B. Using
parcels in CFA has distinct advantages: Not only do they allow
retaining measurement information from many items, but in most
conditions, less biased parameter estimates result when parcels are
used (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). However, we acknowl-
edge that combining items into parcels may also artificially enhance
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the reliability estimates of scores from the measure (Hair et al.,
2010).
Model specification
The hierarchical CFA model (see Figure 3) hypothesizes for both man-
agers and psychology students the following (in line with Byrne and
Stewart, 2006): (a) a dispositional reasoning structure is best repre-
sented by a single higher-order factor of dispositional reasoning and
three lower-order factors (trait induction, trait extrapolation, and trait
contextualization); (b) each observed variable (i.e., parcel) has a non-
zero loading on the lower-order factor it was intended to measure and
zero loadings on other factors (i.e., zero cross-loadings); (c) covariation
among the three lower-order factors is explained by the higher-order
factor of dispositional reasoning; (d) measurement error terms are
uncorrelated; and (e) factor disturbances are uncorrelated.
Model identification
To identify a hierarchical CFA model, it must have at least three first-
order factors, and the latter should have at least two indicators each
(Kline, 2011). The hierarchical model (M3) that we hypothesized (see
Figure 3) satisfies both these requirements: Our model has three first-
order factors and five indicator variables for each first-order factor.
However, the second-order portion of the model must also be identi-
fied in itself. As a solution that specifies a single second-order factor
over three first-order factors is just-identified (Brown, 2015), the resid-
uals of induction and extrapolation were constrained to be equal (using
a procedure outlined by Byrne, 2011) to achieve identification at the
higher-order level of the model.
Latent variable scaling
In addition to adequate model identification, it was necessary to scale
the second-order factor of dispositional reasoning in the model
because it has no observed measures and must be provided a metric
(Brown, 2015). We decided to fix the variance of the second-order
dispositional reasoning factor to 1.0 because it left all three direct
effects of dispositional reasoning on the first-order factors as free
parameters.
3.4.2 | Higher-order CFA procedure
After completing the data preparation, we followed the general
sequence of HCFA proposed by Brown (2015), which was to: (a)
develop a ‘well-behaved’ first-order CFA solution, in other words, one
that fits well and is conceptually valid; (b) examine the magnitude and
pattern of correlations among factors in the first-order model; and (c)
fit the second-order model, based on conceptual and empirical
grounds.
3.4.3 | Measurement invariance
Finally, we conducted MI analysis (Millsap, 2011) of the best fitting fac-
tor model between managers and psychology student samples. To
establish the MI of the first-order models of the factor structure under-
lying our measure of dispositional reasoning, between managers and
psychology students, we followed available guidelines for general MI
(e.g., Brown, 2015; Millsap, 2011; Raykov, Marcoulides, & Li, 2012;
Vandenberg & Lance, 2000), but also specific guidelines to assess
invariance of hierarchical models (e.g., Byrne & Stewart, 2006; Chen,
Sousa, & West, 2005; Cheung, 2008). Our testing strategy involved
hierarchical steps comparing the fit of a series of more constrained
models with less constrained models, relying on the Likelihood Ratio
(LR) test (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013) at each step. The LR test involves
a comparison of the v2-values of the unconstrained and constrained
models and statistically significant increase in v2 as a result of con-
straining a specific set of parameters was used as a criterion for reject-
ing MI.
4 | RESULTS
4.1 | Descriptive statistics
Table 1 and Figure 4 portray the mean dispositional reasoning scores
(overall, and by component) for managers and psychology students.
Results from an independent samples t test indicated that psychology
students (M5 .76, SD5 .10, N5161) scored higher on overall
dispositional reasoning than managers (M5 .45, SD5 .14, N5160),
TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for the managers’ and psychology-students’ samplesa
Variables Descriptives 1 2 3 4
M (SD) Correlations for managers (n5 160)
1. Induction .37 (.18) (a5 .74)
2. Extrapolation .47 (.16) .56** (a5 .66)
3. Contextualization .51 (.19) .47** .44** (a5 .75)
4. Total DR .45 (.14) .83** .80** .80** (a5 .85)
Correlations for psychology-students (n5 161)
1. Induction .74 (.16) (a5 .69)
2. Extrapolation .77 (.10) .53** (a5 .44a)
3. Contextualization .77 (.13) .53** .36** (a5 .59)
4. Total DR .76 (.10) .87** .74** .79** (a5 .79)
Note. Total N5321. DR5Dispositional reasoning total scores. aLower reliabilities for students are likely due to substantial lower dispersion for this
sample. For example, psychology students had lower mean item variance (.14 vs .21) and scale variance (5.46 vs 13.09) for extrapolation, as com-
pared to the manager sample. When the two samples were combined, the alphas were higher: full measure (.93), induction (.86), extrapolation
(.82), and contextualization (.82).
*p< .05; **p< .01 (two-tailed).
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t(287.8)5222.2, p< .001, two-tailed. The difference of .31 scale
points was substantial (scale range: 0%–100%; d52.55, large effect
size r 5 .79, Cohen, 1988) and the 95% confidence interval around
the difference between the group means was relatively precise
(33.7–28.2). As a possible reason, psychology students’ education
might verse them more into the notion of psychological constructs
and their behavioral indicators (Lievens, 2001a, 2001b, 2002).
For the sake of brevity, the mean differences across the two sub-
samples for component scores are not reported; however, they were
all statistically significant, p< .001. Table 1 also reports the intercorre-
lation (uncorrected for unreliability) between the dispositional reason-
ing component scores for the two subsamples.
4.2 | Assessment of models
4.2.1 | General-factor model (M1)
Model assessment was conducted by testing a series of confirmatory
factor analytic models. The results of these tests are reported in Table 2
for the combined sample. Table 3 reports the results separately for
managers and psychology students. The general-factor model (M1, see
Figure 3) of dispositional reasoning was assessed by a first-order con-
firmatory factor analysis based on data from the combined sample. The
fifteen item parcels serve as indicators of the general dispositional rea-
soning factor. The general-factor model (M1) was tested and the fit was
acceptable, v2(90, N5321)5191.50, p < .001, Satorra–Bentler v2 (90,
N5321)5180.99, p< .001, Robust CFI5 .96, TLI5 .95, RMSEA5 .06,
90% CI: [0.05; 0.07], although the relative large chi-square statistic sug-
gested the need for further model improvement.
4.2.2 | Three-component model (M2)
Next, we evaluated a three-component factor model, with trait induc-
tion, trait extrapolation, and trait induction as separate components
(see Figure 2). The three factors were hypothesized to co-vary with
one another and the respective item parcels created from each of the
subscale items serve as indicators of the respective factors. A three-
component model showed relatively good fit, v2(87, N5321)5
117.60, p 5 .016, Satorra–Bentler v2 (87, N5321)5113.29, p< .05,
Robust CFI5 .99, TLI5 .98, RMSEA5 .03, 90% CI: [0.015; 0.048]. All
fifteen item parcels (three first-order latent variables with five item par-
cels each) were significant indicators of their respective latent factors.
We inspected the results of the phi matrix providing the correlations
among the latent variables (or factors) and consistent with our expecta-
tion, all factors were significantly interrelated (range of zs56.76–
10.48). Factor intercorrelations (among the various subdimensions of
the dispositional reasoning components, M2) were generally large
(.84<u< .95). So, the pattern of correlations speaks to the feasibility
of the suggested second-order model (which posited that trait induc-
tion, trait extrapolation, and trait contextualization are more specific
dimensions of broad underlying dispositional reasoning).
4.2.3 | Hierarchical factor model (M3)
Finally, a hierarchical (second-order) factor model of dispositional reason-
ing—this model proposes a general component, influencing the three spe-
cific components of induction, extrapolation, and contextualization—was
tested and support was found because the model showed good fit, v2
(87, N5321)5117.60, p 5 .016, Satorra–Bentler v2 (87, N5321)5
113.29, p< .05, Robust CFI5 .99, TLI5 .98, RMSEA5 .03, 90% CI:
[0.015; 0.048]. Despite being just-identified, the magnitude and statistical
significance of the factor loadings in the higher-order part of the model
TABLE 2 Fit indices for factor structure models of dispositional reasoning measure in combined samplea
Model v2 S-Bv2 df S-Bv2/df NNFI/TLI CFI SRMR pclose fit RMSEA (CI)
M1 191.50** 180.99** 90 2.01 0.95 0.96 0.041 .09 0.059 (0.048; 0.071)
M2 117.60* 113.29* 87 1.30 0.98 0.99 0.031 .98 0.033 (0.015; 0.048)
M3 117.60* 113.18* 87 1.30 0.98 0.99 0.031 .98 0.033 (0.015; 0.048)
Notes. N 5 321. aModels tested here use item parcels as indicator variables and not individual items. M1 5 Single-factor structure; M2 5 Three-factor
structure (Christiansen et al., 2005); M3 5 Hierarchical 2nd-order factor structure (De Kock et al., 2015); v2 5 Normal theory weighted least square
chi-square; S-Bv2, Satorra–Bentler scaled chi-square; df 5 Degrees of freedom; NNFI, Non-normed fit index, a.k.a. Tucker–Lewis index; CFI, Compara-
tive fit index; SMSR, Standardized root mean residual; pclose fit 5 p value for close fit (RMSEA < .05); RMSEA, Root mean square error of approximation
with 90% confidence interval.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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may be meaningfully interpreted (Brown, 2015). Looking at our results
(the completely standardized estimates from the solution), each of the
first-order factors loads strongly on the second-order dispositional rea-
soning factor: induction (g5 .98) and extrapolation (g5 .96) loaded more
strongly than contextualization (g5 .88). As such, dispositional reasoning
as a higher-order factor accounted for substantial proportions of variance
in the individual components: induction 96% (12 .04), extrapolation
91.5% (12 .085), and contextualization 77.1% (12 .229).
4.3 | Model comparison
We compared the baseline model (general-factor model, M1) with the
comparison models. A chi-square difference test (Bryant & Satorra,
2012, 2013) indicated that the nested model (M2) showed significantly
poorer fit compared to the baseline (M1) general-factor model,
Satorra–Bentler v2diff(3, N 5 321)545.033, p< .001. Therefore, the
three-component model of dispositional reasoning fitted significantly
better than a general-factor model.
We also compared a model in which the correlations between dis-
positional reasoning were freely estimated; and a nested comparison
model in which the correlations were constrained to be unity.3 We
used the raw data as input for the analysis and found relatively poor fit
of the nested model, v2 (90, N5321)5189.843, p< .01, RMSEA5 .06
(90% CI: .04; .07). A chi-square difference test indicated that the
nested model (specifying the relationship between dispositional rea-
soning facets as perfectly correlated) showed significantly poorer fit,
compared to the baseline model, v2diff(3, N5321)572.303, p< .001.
Therefore, the evidence suggests that the components are empirically
distinct from one another.
The goodness-of-fit of the hierarchical model (M3) is the same as
the three-component first-order model (M2) in which factors are
allowed to co-vary freely. According to Brown (2015), this is because a
solution that specifies a single second-order factor over three first-
order factors is just-identified (Brown, 2015) and, therefore, it is not
appropriate to statistically compare M3 with M2. Only when the
higher-order model is over-identified, can the nested v2 be used to
determine whether the specification in M3 produces a significant deg-
radation in fit relative to the first-order solution.
However, apart from the higher-order solution not resulting in a
decrease in model fit, it also provides a more parsimonious account for
the correlations among the first-order factors. So, a higher-order model
with dispositional reasoning as a general factor in turn influencing
induction, extrapolation, and contextualization, explains variance in test
scores better than a general-factor model. The model fit strategy out-
lined above (for testing M1, M2, and M3) was repeated in each sepa-
rate subsample and the results are reported in Table 3.
4.4 | Measurement invariance
To compare the factor structure of dispositional reasoning between
managers and psychology students, we conducted MI analyses (see
Table 4). In line with the suggestions of Brown (2015), a baseline model
was first established in each group, followed by tests of equivalence
across groups at each of several increasingly stringent levels of
invariance.
4.4.1 | First-order (M2) invariance
Preliminary analyses
It is preferable to conduct multiple-groups CFA with relatively balanced
sample sizes, as was the case in the present study (managers: N5160;
students: N5161). The Robust ML estimator was used in estimation
of all models and, therefore, all analyses are based on the Satorra–Ben-
tler scaled statistic (SBv2; Satorra & Bentler, 1988). To evaluate all
models we relied on SBv2, as well as on CFI, the root mean square
error of approximation (RMSEA), and SRMR, in line with the recom-
mendations of Byrne and Stewart (2006). The evaluation criteria we
apply for each fit index are outlined in Byrne and Stewart (2006): Val-
ues that adhere to the following cutoffs indicate significant reduction
in fit when comparing two nested models: (a) if corrected DSBv2/Ddf
shows statistical significance; (b) DCFI >.01; and (c) the root mean
square error of approximation (RMSEA)> .08. The first item parcel
within each subscale was used as a marker indicator to define the met-
ric of the latent variable.
Testing for baseline models
As the estimation of baseline models involves no between-group con-
straints, the data were analyzed separately for each group. Prior to
TABLE 3 Sample comparison of fit indices for alternative factor structure models of dispositional reasoning
Model Group v2 S-Bv2 df S-Bv2/df NNFI/TLI CFI SRMR pclose fit RMSEA (CI)
M1 Managers 167.228** 168.758** 90 1.88 0.83 0.85 0.071 .02 0.073 (0.056; 0.090)
Students 111.205 106.555 90 1.18 0.92 0.94 0.060 .79 0.038 (0.000; 0.060)
M2 Managers 99.200 101.210 87 1.16 0.97 0.98 0.052 .91 0.030 (0.000; 0.054)
Students 103.510 98.275 87 1.13 0.94 0.95 0.058 .85 0.034 (0.000; 0.057)
M3 Managers 99.200 101.210 87 1.16 0.97 0.98 0.052 .91 0.030 (0.000; 0.054)
Students 103.510 98.275 87 1.13 0.94 0.95 0.058 .85 0.034 (0.000; 0.057)
Notes. Nmanagers5160; Nstudents5 161; M15 Single-factor structure; M25Three-factor structure (Christiansen et al., 2005); M35Hierarchical 2nd-order
factor structure (De Kock et al., 2015); v25Normal theory weighted least square chi-square; S-Bv2, Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-square; df5Degrees of
freedom; NNFI, Non-normed fit index, a.k.a. Tucker-Lewis index; CFI, Comparative fit index; SMSR, Standardized root mean residual; pclose fit5 p value for
close fit (RMSEA< .05); RMSEA, Root mean square error of approximation with 90% confidence interval.
**p< .01.
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conducting the multiple-groups CFA, we ensured that the suggested
three-factor model is acceptable in both groups. As shown in Table 4,
overall fit statistics for the three-factor solution are consistent with
good model fit in both managers and psychology students. On both
groups, all freely estimated factor loadings are statistically significant
(all ps < .01).
Testing for configural invariance
Configural invariance represents the observance of the same number
of factors and factor loading pattern across groups—no parameter
equality constraints are imposed. For this model, as with subsequent
tests in our invariance analysis where equality constraints are imposed
on particular parameters, data for the two groups are analyzed simulta-
neously in a file combining data for both groups to obtain estimates.
Given that the baseline models are now fitted simultaneously in a mul-
tigroup evaluation, the criterion for configural invariance is that
goodness-of-fit should indicate a well-fitting model. So, we conducted
the simultaneous analysis of equal form. As shown in Table 4, this solu-
tion provides an acceptable fit to the data. This solution (i.e., configural
model) serves as the baseline model for subsequent tests of MI and
population heterogeneity.
Testing for factor loading invariance
In this step, equality constraints are imposed for all freely estimated
first-order factor loadings (except for three items fixed to 1.00 for
the purposes of latent variable scaling). Invariance for this step holds
if goodness-of-fit is adequate and if there is minimal degradation in
fit from the configural model. The analysis evaluates whether factor
loadings (unstandardized) of the dispositional reasoning component
indicators are equivalent in managers and psychology students. In
our data, the equal factor loadings models had an overall good fit to
the data, although it significantly degraded fit relative to the equal
form solution, v2diff(12)539.60, p< .001. As this value is statistically
significant, it follows that the constraints of equal factor loadings in
the restricted model do not hold (Byrne & Stewart, 2006), suggest-
ing that the two models are not equivalent across the manager and
psychology student groups. As the constraint of equal factor load-
ings significantly degrades the fit of the solution, it can be concluded
that the indicators do not evidence comparable relationships to the
latent constructs of dispositional reasoning components in managers
and psychology students (Brown, 2015). This means that a unit
change in the underlying latent variable is not associated with statis-
tically equivalent change in the observed measures (item parcels4) in
both groups.
A closer look at the factor loadings revealed that the mean factor
loading for managers was .57 (SD5 .12) and for psychology students
.48 (SD5 .13). Of these, 80% were invariant (within 1.96 SD). The three
loadings that were not invariant (> 1.96 SD) were equally spread across
components. A failure to demonstrate metric invariance (i.e., factor
loadings are not equivalent across the two groups) was sufficient evi-
dence to terminate the evaluation of further constraints. The results of
further tests are reported in Table 4, however. Overall, from these
results we conclude that only partial MI (Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthen,
1989) between managers and psychology students exists for our
measure.
5 | DISCUSSION
This study contributes to the small albeit growing literature on disposi-
tional reasoning as a key construct by investigating its dimensionality
through a more comprehensive set of confirmatory factor analysis
models (hierarchical, component models, and general-factor models). In
addition, we test the invariance of this measure across two samples
(psychology students and managers) that are often trained in workplace
assessments.
TABLE 4 Tests of invariance of dispositional reasoning in managers and psychology-students
Model v2 df v2diff Ddf RMSEA (90% CI) Cfit CFI TLI NFI PNFI NFIdiff
Single group solutions
Managers (n5 160) 99.200 87 .030 (.000 - .054) .91 .98 .97 .84 .70
Psychology students (n5 161) 103.510 87 .034 (.000 - .057) .85 .95 .94 .76 .63
Measurement invariance
Equal form (configural) 224.495 179 .040 (.020 - .055) .85 .98 .97 .89 .76
Equal factor loadings (weak) 264.102** 191 39.60** 12 .049 (.034 - .063) .54 .96 .96 .87 .79 0.02
Equal indicator intercepts (scalar) 301.070** 203 76.58** 24 .055 (.041 - .068) .26 .95 .95 .85 .83 0.04
Equal indicator error variances 344.114** 213 119.62** 34 .062 (.050 - .074) .05 .93 .93 .83 .85 0.06
Equal factor variances 390.790** 216 166.29** 37 .071 (.060 - .082) .00 .91 .91 .81 .83 0.08
Equal factor covariances 409.503** 219 185.01** 40 .074 (.063 - .085) .00 .90 .90 .80 .84 0.09
Equal factor means 728.912** 222 504.42** 43 .119 (.110 - .129) .00 .72 .74 .65 .68 0.24
Note. N5 321. v2diff5nested v
2 difference; RMSEA5 root mean error of approximation; 90% CI5 90% confidence interval for RMSEA; CFit5 test of
close fit (probability of RMSEA .05); SRMR5 standardized root mean square residual; CFI5 comparative fit index; TLI5Tucker–Lewis index;
NFI5normed fit index; PFI5parsimonious fit index.
* p< .05. ** p< .01. *** p< .001.
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Results supported an hierarchically configured model for disposi-
tional reasoning, with a general factor at a higher stratum driving three
specific facets (trait induction, trait extrapolation, and trait contextuali-
zation) at a lower stratum. Moreover, the hierarchical model showed
acceptable fit within both our psychology students and manager sam-
ples. So, we found evidence for a relatively common factor structure
for dispositional reasoning in both samples. However, we also observed
some lack of metric invariance for the dispositional reasoning measure
between managers and students, in other words, the factor loadings
were overall not equivalent between managers and students.
Follow-up analyses showed that only three (20%) observed variables
showed substantial differences in factor loadings between the two groups.
It is possible that our invariance tests were conservative in the sense that a
minority of observed variables, with large (> 1.96 SD) differences in factor
loadings between groups, led to failure of the overall test for metric invari-
ance. We also considered the location of the noninvariant items within the
component measures: The ‘offending’ observed variables were not located
within particular dispositional reasoning components, but rather, they were
evenly spread. Moreover, the item content of the non-invariant observed
variables did not reveal any clear pattern that may have provided a theo-
retical explanation for the differences in factor loadings between managers
in psychology students. Regarding the overall strength of factor loadings
between the two groups, the mean factor loading (across items) for manag-
ers (.57) was higher than psychology students (.48), which may have con-
tributed to the failure in the invariance test. The overall lower factor
loading of the student group may have resulted, in part, from the relatively
lower dispersion in their item responses, that is, students showed lower
variability than managers and they did better overall on the measure.
Descriptive statistics showed that psychology students outper-
formed managers on the measure of dispositional reasoning by a sub-
stantial margin. As noted, earlier studies revealed also other differences
between managers and psychology students. For example, prior studies
reported that psychology students were better able to provide distinct
assessment center ratings than managers (Lievens, 2001a,b) and differed
from managers in the number and nature of factors they used for selec-
tion decisions (Barr & Hitt, 1986). One interpretation is that—as com-
pared to managers—psychology students may have better developed
schemas that relate to understanding traits, behaviors, and situations, by
virtue of their education and professional training. However, it is impor-
tant to qualify these explanations because metric equivalence is required
to make meaningful between group comparisons of the respective
scores. Without metric equivalence, mean differences in scores between
these groups cannot be unambiguously interpreted, because it is unclear
whether score differences are due to actual differences in this ability (i.e.,
the schema-based explanation mentioned above), or to different psycho-
metric responses to the scale items (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002).
This study has several limitations. First, by grouping assessors into
two relatively coarse categories (managers vs. psychology students) it
may obscure other important individual differences within these
groups, such as gender and ethnicity. More research is needed to see
how stable are the reported factor solutions for dispositional reasoning
between gender and ethnic groups. Second, the modest sample sizes
that we used prohibited fitting our models using item-level data. Given
the potential limitations of item parceling as a strategy (Little et al.,
2002) we also fitted the measurement models first at the item level in
the combined sample. In addition, we tested the effect of different par-
celing strategies on the study’s final results—the choice of parceling
strategy did not change the substantive conclusions. Third, we did not
include psychologists in our study, although psychologists are also an
important group of assessors in practice (Krause & Thornton, 2009).
Future studies should investigate the measurement properties of our
dispositional reasoning measure in a sample of psychologists.
In terms of future research, we see the following avenues. First,
studies should consider the measurement of dispositional reasoning
across different cultures. Our measure is based on the Big Five personal-
ity framework. Although this framework is relatively universal, personality
traits may be expressed in unique ways across cultures (Church, 2000;
Heine & Buchtel, 2009). Moreover, people from different cultures may
have idiosyncratic interpretations of the same observed behavior and
how it clusters into constructs (Willmann, Feldt, & Amelang, 1997). As
such, cultural groups may score differently on a common set of items
that tap into knowledge and understanding of trait concepts. They may
have different psychometric responses to the scale items (Cheung &
Rensvold, 2002). So, we recommend that future studies consider MI and
mean differences between different cultural groups.
Another issue for future studies is to further evaluate the discrimi-
nant validity of our dispositional reasoning measure, to show that it is
distinct from general mental ability and other abilities (spatial, analyti-
cal, problem-solving, etc.) and personality (attention to detail, empathy,
emotional intelligence, etc.) that are often used in ‘good judge’ studies.
Finally, a fruitful avenue is to consider whether or not dispositional
reasoning is independent of the trait or content being assessed. Dispo-
sitional reasoning may be understood broadly as the ability to reason
about traits and dispositions. Our measure (as with the measure of
Christiansen et al., 2005) was ‘cast in the mold’ of the Big Five person-
ality framework. This typology was a good place to start because it is
an overarching framework that is generally accepted. However, in prin-
ciple we could develop a test that measures people’s knowledge about
any dispositions, just like with tests of general mental ability different
stimulus material can be used in different sets of items. Therefore,
measures can be developed also for other referent constructs (e.g.,
interview dimensions, see Huffcutt, Conway, Roth, & Stone, 2001).
Our findings suggest some implications for practice. As noted,
measures of dispositional reasoning may be useful for both groups
because they represent the pools of assessors that are often trained in
workplace assessments (Krause & Thornton, 2009; Lievens, 2001a). In
our analyses, an hierarchical model with three components showed the
best fit, suggesting that organizations may develop assessor training
interventions to target specific components (induction, extrapolation,
or contextualization) and they might report both an overall disposi-
tional reasoning score, as well as subscores for the three components.
Moreover, lack of MI suggests that some adjustments to the disposi-
tional reasoning measure might be needed according to the respective
group (i.e., managers vs. psychology students).
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NOTES
1 Psychology students represent an important group of assessors in our
study, given that they are normally trained as psychologist assessors.
2 Some manager respondents (n5146) were also included in another study
investigating the criterion-related validity of dispositional reasoning scores
(De Kock et al., 2015).
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
4 As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, the fundamental meaning of
our invariance tests for factor loadings would have been clearer if we had
used individual test items, rather than item parcels.
REFERENCES
Bandalos, D. L., & Finney, S. J. (2001). Item parcelling issues in structural
equation modeling. In G. A. Marcoulides & R. E. Shumacker (Eds.),
New developments and techniques in structural equation modeling (pp.
269–296). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Barr, S. H., & Hitt, M. A. (1986). A comparison of selection decision mod-
els in manager versus student samples. Personnel Psychology, 39,
599–617. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-6570.1986.tb00955.x
Bernstein, I. H., & Teng, G. (1989). Factoring items and factoring scales are differ-
ent: Spurious evidence for multidimensionality due to item categorization.
Psychological Bulletin, 105, 467–477. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.
105.3.467
Brown, T. A. (2015). Confirmatory factor analysis for applied research (2nd
ed.). New York: Guilford.
Bryant, F. B., & Satorra, A. (2012). Principles and practice of scaled difference
chi-square testing. Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Jour-
nal, 19, 372–398. https://doi.org/10.1080/10705511.2012.687671
Bryant, F. B., & Satorra, A. (2013). EXCEL macro file for conducting scaled
difference chi-square tests via LISREL 8, LISREL 9, EQS, and Mplus.
Chicago: Loyola University. Macro file available from the authors.
Byrne, B. M. (2011). Structural equation modeling with Mplus: Basic con-
cepts, applications, and programming. New York: Routledge.
Byrne, B. M., & Stewart, S. M. (2006). Teacher’s corner: The MACS approach
to testing for multigroup invariance of a second-order structure: A walk
through the process. Structural EquationModeling: AMultidisciplinary Jour-
nal, 13, 287–321. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15328007sem1302_7
Carroll, J. B. (2003). The higher-stratum structure of cognitive abilities:
Current evidence supports g and about ten broad factors. In N. Hel-
muth (Ed.), The scientific study of general intelligence (pp. 5–21).
Oxford, United Kingdom: Pergamon.
Chen, F. F., Sousa, K. H., & West, S. G. (2005). Teacher’s corner: Testing
measurement invariance of second-order factor models. Structural
Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal, 12, 471–492. https://
doi.org/10.1207/s15328007sem1203_7
Cheung, G. W. (2008). Testing equivalence in the structure, means, and
variances of higher-order constructs with structural equation model-
ing. Organizational Research Methods, 11, 593–613. https://doi.org/10.
1177/1094428106298973
Cheung, G. W., & Rensvold, R. B. (2002). Evaluating goodness-of-fit
indexes for testing measurement invariance. Structural Equation
Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal, 9, 233–255. https://doi.org/10.
1207/S15328007SEM0902_5
Christiansen, N. D., Wolcott-Burnam, S., Janovics, J. E., Burns, G. N., &
Quirk, S. W. (2005). The good judge revisited: Individual differences
in the accuracy of personality judgments. Human Performance, 18,
123–149. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327043hup1802_2
Church, A. T. (2000). Culture and personality: Toward an integrated cul-
tural trait psychology. Journal of Personality, 68, 651–703. https://doi.
org/10.1111/1467-6494.00112
Cropanzano, R., Weiss, H. M., Hale, J. M. S., & Reb, J. (2003). The struc-
ture of affect: Reconsidering the relationship between negative and
positive affectivity. Journal of Management, 29, 831–857. https://doi.
org/10.1016/s0149-2063_03_00081-3
De Kock, F. S., Lievens, F., & Born, M. P. (2015). An in-depth look at dis-
positional reasoning and interviewer accuracy. Human Performance,
28, 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/08959285.2015.1021046
Funder, D. C. (2012). Accurate personality judgment.Current Directions in Psycho-
logical Science, 21, 177–182. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721412445309
Gardner, H. (1993). Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligences.
New York, NY: Basic Book/Harper Collins.
Gaugler, B. B., Rosenthal, D. B., Thornton, G. C., III., & Bentson, C.
(1987). Meta-analysis of assessment center validity. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 72, 493–511.
Goldberg, L. R. (1992). The development of markers for the big-five fac-
tor structure. Psychological Assessment, 4, 26–42. https://doi.org/10.
1037/1040-3590.4.1.26
Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., & Anderson, R. E. (2010). Multivari-
ate data analysis: A global perspective (7th ed.). Upper Saddle River,
NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Heine, S. J., & Buchtel, E. E. (2009). Personality: The universal and the cul-
turally specific. Annual Review of Psychology, 60, 369–394. https://doi.
org/10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163655
Horn, J. L., & Cattell, R. B. (1966). Refinement and test of the theory of
fluid and crystallized general intelligences. Journal of Educational Psy-
chology, 57, 253–270. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0023816
Huffcutt, A. I., Conway, J. M., Roth, P. L., & Stone, N. J. (2001). Identifi-
cation and meta-analytic assessment of psychological constructs
measured in employment interviews. Journal of Applied Psychology,
86, 897–913. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.86.5.897
J€oreskog, K., & S€orbom, D. (2015). LISREL (Version 9.2). Skokie, IL: Scien-
tific Software International, Inc.
Kishton, J. M., & Widaman, K. F. (1994). Unidimensional versus domain
representative parceling of questionnaire items: An empirical exam-
ple. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 54, 757–765. https://
doi.org/10.1177/0013164494054003022
Kline, R. B. (2011). Principles and practice of structural equation modeling
(3rd ed.). New York: Guilford Press.
Krause, D. E., & Thornton, G. C. (2009). A cross-cultural look at assess-
ment center practices: Survey results from Western Europe and
North America. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 58,
557–585. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1464-0597.2008.00371.x
Lievens, F. (2001a). Assessor training strategies and their effects on accuracy,
interrater reliability, and discriminant validity. Journal of Applied Psychology,
86, 255–264. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.86.2.255
Lievens, F. (2001b). Assessors and use of assessment centre dimensions:
A fresh look at a troubling issue. Journal of Organizational Behavior,
22, 203–221. https://doi.org/10.1002/job.65
Lievens, F. (2002). Trying to understand the different pieces of the
construct validity puzzle of assessment centers: An examination of
assessor and assessee effects. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87,
675–686. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.87.4.675
Little, T. D., Cunningham, W. A., Shahar, G., & Widaman, K. F. (2002). To
parcel or not to parcel: Exploring the question, weighing the merits.
Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal, 9, 151–173.
https://doi.org/10.1207/s15328007sem0902_1
Lord, F. M., & Novick, M. R. (1968). Statistical theories of mental test
scores. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
MacCallum, R. C., Browne, M. W., & Sugawara, H. M. (1996). Power
analysis and determination of sample size for covariance structure
250 | DE KOCK ET AL.
modeling. Psychological Methods, 1, 130–149. https://doi.org/10.
1037/1082-989x.1.2.130
Mayer, J. D., Caruso, D. R., & Salovey, P. (1999). Emotional intelligence
meets traditional standards for an intelligence. Intelligence, 27,
267–298. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0160-2896(99)00016-1
Millsap, R. E. (2011). Statistical approaches to measurement invariance.
New York, NY: Routledge.
Powell, D. M., & Bourdage, J. S. (2016). The detection of personality traits in
employment interviews: Can “good judges” be trained? Personality and Indi-
vidual Differences, 94, 194–199. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2016.01.009
Powell, D. M., & Goffin, R. D. (2009). Assessing personality in the employ-
ment interview: The impact of training on rater accuracy.Human Perform-
ance, 22, 450–465. https://doi.org/10.1080/08959280903248450
Raykov, T., Marcoulides, G. A., & Li, C. H. (2012). Measurement invari-
ance for latent constructs in multiple populations: A critical view and
refocus. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 72, 954–974.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0013164412441607
Reise, S. P., Waller, N. G., & Comrey, A. L. (2000). Factor analysis and
scale revision. Psychological Assessment, 12, 287–297. https://doi.
org/10.1037/1040-3590.12.3.287
Satorra, A., & Bentler, P. M. (1988). Scaling corrections for chi-square
statistics in covariance structure analysis. In Proceedings of the Ameri-
can Statistical Association (Vol. 1, pp. 308–313). Alexandria, VA:
American Statistical Association.
Spearman, C. (1904). “General Intelligence,” objectively determined and
measured. American Journal of Psychology, 15, 201–292. https://doi.
org/10.2307/1412107
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2013). Using multivariate statistics (6th
ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
Taft, R. (1955). The ability to judge people. Psychological Bulletin, 52,
1–23. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0044999
Tett, R. P., & Guterman, H. A. (2000). Situation trait relevance, trait
expression, and cross-situational consistency: Testing a principle of
trait activation. Journal of Research in Personality, 34, 397–423.
https://doi.org/10.1006/jrpe.2000.2292
Thornton, G. C., & Krause, D. E. (2009). Selection versus development
assessment centers: An international survey of design, execution, and
evaluation. The International Journal of Human Resource Management,
20, 478–498. https://doi.org/10.1080/09585190802673536
Vandenberg, R. J., & Lance, C. E. (2000). A review and synthesis of the
measurement invariance literature: Suggestions, practices, and recom-
mendations for organizational research. Organizational Research Meth-
ods, 3, 4–70. https://doi.org/10.1177/109442810031002
Vernon, P. E. (1933). Some characteristics of the good judge of personal-
ity. Journal of Social Psychology, 4, 42–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/
00224545.1933.9921556
Willmann, E., Feldt, K., & Amelang, M. (1997). Prototypical behaviour
patterns of social intelligence: An intercultural comparison between
Chinese and German subjects. International Journal of Psychology, 32,
329–346. https://doi.org/10.1080/002075997400692
Wolf, E. J., Harrington, K. M., Clark, S. L., & Miller, M. W. (2013). Sample size
requirements for structural equation models: An evaluation of power,
bias, and solution propriety. Educational and Psychological Measurement,
76, 913–934. https://doi.org/10.1177/0013164413495237
Yang, C., Nay, S., & Hoyle, R. H. (2010). Three approaches to using
lengthy ordinal scales in structural equation models: Parceling, latent
scoring, and shortening scales. Applied Psychological Measurement, 34,
122–142. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146621609338592
How to cite this article: De Kock FS, Lievens F, Born MP. A
closer look at the measurement of dispositional reasoning:
Dimensionality and invariance across assessor groups. Int J Select
Assess. 2017;25:240–252. https://doi.org/10.1111/ijsa.12176
APPENDIX A: EXAMPLE ITEMS FROM THE DISPOSITIONAL REASONING TEST
Trait induction
Circle the letter that corresponds most to the trait you think is represented by the word:
Trait
Behavior
Emotional
stability Extraversion Openness Agreeableness Conscientiousness
Sloppy X
Irritable X
Trait extrapolation
For example, one item depicted ‘John’ as ‘John’s coworkers all describe him as efficient, thorough, and persistent. MOST likely John also:’. Next,
respondents had to choose the best answer from the following options:
A feels the need to be around lot of people,
B has a great deal of sympathy for those less fortunate,
C doesn’t often give in to his impulses,
D enjoys fantasizing and daydreaming.
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Clearly, only option (C), ‘doesn’t often give in to his impulses’ relates to
the focal trait (conscientiousness) in the original person description.
Trait contextualization
For example, one item stated ‘Which of the following situations is most
relevant to the trait of organization?’. Then, respondents had to select
the most appropriate answer from three options (correct answer in
bold):
A You are busy with a task and people continuously interrupt you
B On your way home you drive past a broken down vehicle
C Over the last 2 years, you have been employed at a job that
entails working by yourself. Your boss offers you a chance to do
essentially the same thing, but in a group of coworkers
APPENDIX B: PARCELING STRATEGY:
DIMENSIONALITY CONSIDERATIONS
An appropriate parceling strategy should be identified given the dimen-
sionality of the factor structure underlying a set of item scores. Explor-
atory factor analysis of our item-level data (using Principal Axis
Factoring, with Oblimin rotation, considered appropriate for our data,
as suggested by Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013) indicated possible multidi-
mensionality within all three first-order factors, namely for induction,
extrapolation, and contextualization. However, we also had to consider
the possibility that multidimensionality within each component of dis-
positional reasoning may be due to statistical artifacts. For example,
multiple dimensions may also be artificially created when items vary in
terms of their difficulty levels. Even if various items measure the same
construct, the resulting correlation coefficients between these items
may be low if the response thresholds vary much (Lord & Novick,
1968). As a result, techniques that are based on correlations, such as
factor analysis, may cause artifacts in the form of spurious ‘difficulty
factors’ with little if any psychological meaning (Bernstein & Teng,
1989; Reise, Waller, & Comrey, 2000). Stated otherwise, it is possible
that items with similar distributions may tend to form factors irrespec-
tive of their item content. The p values of the 64 items in our combined
dispositional reasoning measure varied (Mp5 .61; SDp517; Minp5 .20;
Maxp5 .93).
Although some authors (e.g., Bandalos & Finney, 2001) argue that
parceling should be reserved for conditions of unidimensionality, Little
and colleagues (2002) suggest two specific strategies for parceling
items when item scores indicate a multidimensional factor structure.
First, an internal consistency approach creates parcels that use the fac-
ets observed as grouping criteria. In this approach, items contained
within a facet are clustered to form a combined item parcel, yielding
internally consistent facets as manifest indicators of the higher stratum
construct and keeping the multidimensional nature of the construct
explicit. Second, the domain-representative approach is a method that
creates parcels by joining items from different facets into combined
item clusters. For example, a parcel would contain items from each fac-
ets identified through dimensionality analysis. So, each parcel reflects
all of the facets present within a set of items—this solution accounts
for the multidimensionality inherent in a set of items. The domain rep-
resentation approach has shown to be superior in some studies (e.g.,
Kishton & Widaman, 1994). Finally, a random item assignment strategy
may be used. We decided to utilize random item assignment as a par-
celing strategy, as it recognizes the possibility that difficulty factors
may cause spurious dimensions within each component of dispositional
reasoning. We also ran the analyses using the two other parceling
strategies—the choice of parceling strategy had no substantive effect
on the final results.
252 | DE KOCK ET AL.
